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A Lawyer's Guide:
How to Avoid Pitfalls
When Dealing with Alien Clients
BY KELLY KAISER*
I. INTRODUCTION
any attorneys feel that they need not delve into the abyss of
immigration law There is a very real misconception m the
legal community that "immigration matters" affect only
those attorneys who specialize m the immigration field. However, Congress
recently created many drastic changes m the immigration law arena that
may have a severe unpact on attorneys practicing outside this specific area
of the law 'As the number of immigrants m the United States continues to
increase,' it is imperative that attorneys are made aware of potential
consequences arising from an ignorance of immigration law when dealing
with clients who may be non-citizens.
Part I of this Note gives a brief survey of the history of immigration
law m the United States. Part II examines the interrelationship between
immigration law and criminal law and emphasizes problem areas that
* J.D. expected 1999, University of Kentucky
'See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
("IIIRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1101).
2 See Elwm Griffith, The Road Between the Section 212(C) Waiver and
Cancellation of-Removal under Section 240A of the Immigration and Nationality
Act - The Impact of the 1996 Reform Legislation, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 65, 65 &
n.1 (1997) (stating 804,416 were admitted in 1994 for permanent residence).
Kentucky also has experienced a large growth in its immigrant population. An
estimated 34,000 foreign-born people reside in Kentucky One-fifth of these
immigrants live in the Lexington-Fayette County area. Many immigrants work in
the areas of construction, tobacco harvesting, and the meatpacking and poultry
processing industries. See generally FederationforAmercan Immigration Reform
(visited Mar. 28, 1998) <http://www.fairus.org/042ky702.htm>
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attorneys should avoid m order to better serve their non-citizen clients. Part
m illustrates the salient issue of how to effectively provide interpretive
services for a non-English-speaking client in order to secure for him or her
rights protected by the United States Constitution. This Note concludes that
it is essential for criminal defense attorneys to educate themselves about
the immigration consequences that accompany guilty pleas and verdicts in
order to provide "effective assistance of counsel" to their clients. This Note
also suggests that without adequate safeguards to ensure that interpretive
services are adequate and accurate, the constitutional rights of a non-
English-speaking criminal defendant may be violated.
The United States Constitution grants Congress the power to make all
laws governing immigration and naturalization matters Throughout
history, Congress has utilized its textually demonstrated power regarding
immigration law to alter, amend, and add to existing immigration laws.
Before 1940, immigration laws called for the automatic deportation of any
undocumented alien living within the borders of the United States.4 The
Alien Registration Act of 1940 created an exception to the automatic
deportation of undocumented aliens.' This exception allowed the Attorney
General to suspend deportation proceedings for an alien who had lived in
the United States for five or more years, had "good moral character," and
had a spouse or child who was a United States citizen or lawful permanent
resident and who would suffer economically if the alien were to be
deported.6 Congress significantly narrowed this exception in 1952.1 The
exception was limited to aliens who could demonstrate that deportation
would cause an "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien
or his spouse, parent or child, who is a citizen or alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence."8 Congress again changed the exception in 1962
alleviating its harsh result on non-citizens, by expanding the exception to
aliens committing less serious crimes if they could prove-that deportation
would cause an "extreme hardship" to their spouses, parents, or children.'
3 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
4 See William C.B. Underwood, Unreviewable Discretionary Justice: The New
Extreme Hardship in Cancellation of Deportation Cases, 72 IND. L. J. 885, 889
(1997).
' See id. (citing Alien Registration Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-670, § 20, 54
Stat. 670, 672 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.)).
6 Id.
7 See id. (citing Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 244(a),
66 Stat. 163, 214 (1952) (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.)).8 Act of June 27, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 244(a), 66 Stat. 163, 214.
9 See Underwood, supra note 4, at 889.
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In 1994, the exception was broadened even further, allowing the Attorney
General to suspend the deportation of victims of severe domestic violence
at the hands of their spouses or parents who are United States citizens or
lawful permanent residents.'"
Given this history of continuous revision ofimmigration laws, it comes
as no surprise that in 1996 Congress enacted comprehensive immigration
reform in response to the growing concern over United States inmigration
matters. Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA"), 1 which has broad-sweeping
implications for all immigrants and immigration law practitioners. The
IIRIRA merged the waiver-of-deportation and suspension-of-deportation
methods of relief, consolidating them into "cancellation of removal."'2 The
IIRIRA also serves as a "war on illegal immigration" in response to public
concerns over the number of undocumented aliens in the United States: It
increased the number of border patrol officers at the United States-Mexico
border," increased penalties for alien-smuggling and fraudulent documen-
tation,'4 and facilitated the removal of inadmissible and deportable aliens. 5
The area of immigration law is extremely complex and ever-evolving.
Therefore, the practitioner may be tempted to leave these thorny issues to
the immigration specialist. "[A]s with other collateral consequences of
crime - license revocation from professionals, debarment of contractors,
school discipline of students, disenfranchisement of voters, etc. - the
immigration-related issues are generally deemed irelevant to the criminal
justice process."' 6 However, with the passage of the IIRIRA, the once-
isolated area of immigration law has begun to become integrated into other
'o See id.
MU IIRIRA, supra note 1.
12 id. § 240A (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229b).
'3 See id. § 101 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101).
14 See id. § 203 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324). Within the Hispanic
community, an alien illegally smuggled across the United States border is
commonly referred to as brought by a "coyote." Coyotes smuggle aliens across the
border for a fee. Many undocumented aliens claim to have been smuggled across
the border, free, by friends and family members. See generally Alexandra Marks,
Tight Border Aids People-Smuggling: Case in New York Shows How a Tighter
Mexican Border May Lead to Exploitation, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 24,
1997
'- See generally Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, §§ 301-305 (to be
codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
6 Susan L. Pilcher, Justice Without a Blindfold: Criminal Proceedings and the
Alien Defendant, 50 ARK. L. REv 269 (1997).
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areas of the law Criminal law, in particular, has become a battleground for
inmigration issues. Attorneys practicing criminal law should familiarize
themselves with the relevant provisions.
I. THE INTERMINGLING OF IMMIGRATION
LAW AND CRIMINAL LAW
It is critical for criminal defense attorneys to educate themselves about
the manner in which immigration law and criminal law have become
intertwined. An alien's eligibility to remain in the United States may be
destroyed by a criminal conviction in certain circumstances.1 7 Therefore,
in order to avoid unforeseen deportation proceedings, attorneys must arm
themselves with knowledge about immigration law Recent legislation has
granted judges the discretion to issue orders of deportation concurrently
with judicial sentencing, provided that the judge holds a mini-deportation
hearing."8 Exercising this discretion undoubtedly would greatly increase
any court's work load, because immigration hearings entail their own
procedures, issues, and evidence.19
While immigration issues have always been considered a civil matter,
the close relationship thathas developedbetween criminal andimmigration
matters raises numerous questions and concerns. It is theoretically possible
that the traditional rights of aliens in immigration proceedings will be
expanded due to the intimate coexistence of immigration and criminal
proceedings. "[A]liens may be entitled to more expansive procedural
rights; effective defense representation will likely require counsel on
immigration matters; and the ethical obligations of all criminal justice
practitioners will likely broaden to encompass immigration-related
concerns."20 The process of encouraging prompt and efficient removal of
aliens convicted of certain criminal offenses is commonly referred to as
"expedited removal."21 Aliens are subject to "expedited removal" if they
are convicted of, or plead guilty to, "aggravated felonies, 2 "controlled
SSee nfra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
'8 See Pilcher, supra note 16, at 273 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c) (Supp. 1997)).
19 The author believes that it is unlikely that a judge would take such an
additional burden upon himself or herself when court dockets are already
overcrowded, but it does exist as an option.
2 0 Pilcher, supra note 16, at 276.
21 Id. at 286.
Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (Supp. 1997), which contains a list of
cnmes designated as "aggravated felonies." The list includes, but is not limited to,
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substance offenses," or crimes of "moral turpitude,"24 to name a few
Although these aliens are automatically "deportable," they will not
necessarily be deported.5 There are two exceptions under which a
convicted alien may, with difficulty, obtain a cancellation of removal under
the IERIRA.26 First, the Attorney General has the discretionary power to
refrain from deporting an alien who has been a lawful permanent resident
for a minimum of five years and a continuous resident in the United States
for seven years.2 Tis remedy, however, is not available for an alien who
has been convicted of an aggravated felony 28 The second avenue for
cancellation of removal provides relief to aliens who are not lawful
permanent residents but have been residents of the United States for at least
ten continuous years, have exhibited "good moral character" during their
stay in the United States, and present evidence that their removal would
murder, rape, drug trafficking, felonious crimes of violence, offenses related to
obstruction ofjustice, illicit trafficking in firearms, and sexual abuse of a minor).
See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).
' See Pilcher, supra note 16, at 286 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (Supp.
1997)).
24 See id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(2)(A) (Supp. 1997)). A crime of moral
turpitude is "an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social
duties which a man owes to his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the
accepted and customary rule of right and duty between men." A.L.R. FED. 480, §
3 (1975). Some, but not all, of the offenses interpreted to be crimes of moral
turpitude are murder, rape, bigamy, tax evasion, and violation of immigration laws.
See id.
2' These provisions of the IIRIRA became controversial when Dateline NBC (a
television news program) ran a feature on Jesus Collado, 43, who was taken into
custody by the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS"). He had been
convicted of statutory rape when he was nineteen years old because he had sex with
his underage girlfriend. SeeDatelineNBC(NBC television broadcast). Collado had
lived in the United States for over twenty years, raised a family, and started a
thriving restaurant business, and had had no other brushes with the law. The
retroactive nature of the IIRIRA and its harsh consequences for people like Collado
caused outrage across the country Dateline's broadcast and the public outcry
following it may have been the impetus for Collado's release from prison on
October 24, 1997 Mr. Collado, however, remains a defendant in INS deporta-
tion proceedings. See In re Jesus Collado, BIA 3333, 1998 WL 95929 (Feb. 26,
1998).
26 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) & (b) (Supp. 1997).
27See id. § 1229b(a)(1)-(2).
2 See id. § 1229b(a)(3).
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create an "exceptional and extremely unusual hardshp"29 for themselves
or their spouse, parents, or children who are U.S. citizens or aliens
"lawfully admitted for permanent residence."3 While these two avenues for
"cancellation of removal" may allow some aliens to remain within the
United States, very few will successfully obtain these remedies. Moreover,
Congress has put an annual limit of 4000 on the number of applications for
adjustment of status of lawful permanent residents that may be granted.3
Both avenues for recommending cancellation of removal fall squarely
within the discretionary powers of the judge overseeing the case.32 It is
difficult to persuade ajudge that a particular alien is deserving of one of the
few available grants of cancellation of removal, especially when that alien
client is a convicted criminal. Furthermore, there are no appellate processes
for review of a judge's denial of an application for cancellation of
removal. 3
A. Responsibilities ofLegal Players When Dealing with Alien
Crminal Defendants
The significant link between the criminal justice system and immigra-
tion procedures affect all actors in the criminal process. Judges, prosecu-
29 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has construed
"extreme hardship" in a very narrow sense. The Board of Immigration Appeals
determines whether the alien has proven "extreme hardship," and the courts of
appeals give great deference to these Board determinations. See generally Hamdan
v. I.N.S., No. 95-3701, 1996 WL 382261 (6th Cir. July 5, 1996). "[T]he common
results of deportation, such as separation from family and financial difficulties, are
insufficient to establish extreme hardship. [P]etitioner must make a showing of 'at
least hardship substantially different from and more severe than that suffered by the
ordinary alien who is deported."' Id. at *2 (quoting Sanchez v I.N.S., 755 F.2d
1158, 1161 (5th Cir. 1985)). The Hamdan decision indicates the Sixth Circuit's
reluctance to overturn denials of deportation suspension by the Board. Therefore,
unless an alien can illustrate very severe and quite unusual circumstances
surrounding his or her deportation, it seems that he or she will not prevail in
seeking reversal of the Board's denial of deportation. However, if the Board fails
to consider all relevant factors in determining whether "extreme hardship" exists,
the court will reverse the determination as an abuse of discretion. See Silva-Oliva
v I.N.S., No. 86-3199, 1987 WL 35871 (6th Cir. Jan. 21, 1987).30See 8 U.S.C § 1229b(1) (Supp. 1997).
31 See id. § 1229b(e)(1)-(2).
32 See Casem v I.N.S., 8 F.3d 700 (9th Cir. 1993).
31 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (Supp. 1997).
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tors, and defense attorneys must acknowledge and deal with the immigra-
tion questions presented in any criminal trial for an alien; otherwise, the
alien's future in the United States will essentially be decided by the luck of
the draw Tis immense power to control an alien's future as a Umted
States resident "cames with it the obligation to exercise the power fairly
and responsibly "34 All actors within the criminal justice system have a
great deal of control regarding how the case will affect the defendant
alien's immigration status. A criminal defense attorieymusttake great care
to explain the consequences of an "aggravated felony"35 conviction to his
or her client, because ignorance of the possible deportation consequences
will put the defendant at a severely crippling disadvantage in deciding
whether to plead guilty Since a prosecutor has significant discretion in
determining what charges will be pursued, he or she may be persuaded to
pursue criminal charges that do not trigger expedited removal. It may,
therefore, be beneficial for the alien defendant to plead guilty to several
lesser offenses in lieu of pleading guilty to a felony that may render hin or
her deportable. Likewise, the judge has the ability to tailor sentencing, by
limiting the sentence to under one year, to avoid classifying an alien
defendant as an "aggravated felon."'36
B. Guilty Pleas and "Effective Counsel"
In light of the fact that alien defendants have so much at stake when
they face criminal charges, one subject of considerable controversy arises
regarding a defense attorney's duty to a client. The salient issue is whether
a defense attorney who fails to inform an alien defendant of possible
deportation consequences in a criminal case constitutes ineffective counsel.
A determination of ineffective counsel would demand that the conviction
or guilty plea be reversed, so the issue is a critical one for alien defendants.
In Stncklandv. Washington,3 7 the United States Supreme Court articulated
a test for determining whether counsel is "ineffective" in violation of the
3" Pilcher, supra note 16, at 299.
35See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
36 See generally Koon v United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996) (noting that the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1989, 18 U.S.C. § 3883(a), has limited a judge's
discretion in federal sentencing).
37Strickland v Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.38 The Strickland test
has two components. First, the defendant must prove that the attorney's
performance was deficient to the point of being unreasonable.39 The basis
for this determination is derived from an assessment of whether the
attorney's behavior is within the standard range of professional norms for
other defense attorneys." The second prong of the Strickland test requires
the defendant to prove that the attorney's deficient performance so
prejudiced the defense as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.4'
Strickland poses yet another hurdle to defendants because it creates a
strong presumption that counsel's conduct is within the range of competent
and reasonable professional assistance. 2 Courts throughout the United
States have reached differing conclusions as to whether failure to advise
alien defendants of possible deportation consequences constitutes
ineffective counsel. 3 The United States Supreme Court has yet to decide
this issue.
C. Immigration Consequences - Collateral or Direct Consequences?
Many jurisdictions have held that an attorney's failure to discuss
deportation consequences with an alien defendant does not constitute
ineffective counsel for Sixth Amendment purposes.' Courts have
emphasized the fact that immigration consequences arising from a guilty
plea are considered to be collateral consequences. These courts have held
that a defendant's attorneyneednot disclose immigration consequences for
the defendant's plea to qualify as voluntary For example, in State v.
" See id. at 668 (denying petition for habeas corpus and ruling that even
assuming defendant's counsel conducted himself unreasonably in that he failed to
investigate all mitigating factors, the defendant suffered insufficient prejudice to
set aside his conviction); U.S. CONST. amend IV
39 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.
40 See id.
41 See id.
42 See id. at 689.
41 See, e.g., United States v Qum, 836 F.2d 654 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that
failure to advise client constituted ineffective counsel); United States ar rel. Potts
v Chrans, 700 F Supp. 1505 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (holding that failure to advise client
did not constitute ineffective counsel).
" See, e.g., United States v Banda, 1 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 1993); United States
v George, 869 F.2d 333 (7th Cir. 1989); State v Ginebra, 511 So. 2d 960 (Fla.
1987); In re Peters, 750 P.2d 643 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988).
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Ginebra,45 the Supreme Court of Florida held that defense counsel is not
required to inform an alien defendant of immigration consequences that
may accompany a guilty plea.' Rather, the court noted, defense counsel is
bound only to advise his or her client of the "direct consequences" of a
guilty plea. 7 The court noted that immigration consequences are similar to
other collateral consequences in that the trial court judge is not responsible
for imposing such consequences upon the defendant.4" The INS, an
independent government agency, assumes responsibility for the immigra-
tion aspects of the defendant's conviction. 9 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reached a decision very similar to Ginebra
m United States v. George.5 Like the Florida state court, the Seventh
Circuit refused to acknowledge lack of disclosure regarding immigration
consequences as ineffective counsel.51 The court held that
actual knowledge of consequences which are collateral to the guilty plea
is not a prerequisite to the entry of a knowing and intelligent plea. A
deportation proceeding is a civil proceeding wuch may result from a
criminal prosecution, but is not a part of or enmeshed in the criminal
proceeding.
52
Similarly, a Washington state court placed substantial weight on the
distinction between direct and collateral consequences in In re Peters.
5
1
The opimon noted that a defendant must be informed of all direct
consequences of a guilty plea in order for the plea to be fully voluntary, but
that he or she need not be informed of all collateral consequences that may
arise. 4 The court classified immigration consequences as collateral
consequences because the results are administered by the INS rather than
the court system.5 Distinctions between direct and collateral consequences
depend on whether" 'the result represents a definite, immediate and largely
" State v Ginebra, 511 So. 2d960 (Fla. 1987).
46 See Id. at 962.
47 See id. at 960.
48 See id. at 961.
41 See Underwood, supra note 4, at 895.
50 United States v George, 869 F.2d 333 (7th Cir. 1989).
51 See id. at 338.
52Id. at 337
53 In re Peters, 750 P.2d 643 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988).
'See d. at 645.
5 See id.
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automatic effect on the range of the defendant's punishment.' ,5 6 This
principle was convincingly stated in United States v. Banda,57 in which the
Fifth Circuit noted that it had previously "nailed the door shut on any due
process claim based on counsel's failure to warn the criminal defendant of
possible deportation. '58 The court emphasized that although deportation is
a harsh collateral consequence, other collateral consequences, such as
abrogation of the rights to vote and travel, are equally harsh, and these
warrant no special consideration. 9 Therefore, the court ruled that no
"ineffective counsel" claim based on an attorney's failure to disclose
possible deportation consequences to a client would prevail." Other
jurisdictions holding that an attorney's failure to warn alien defendants of
immigration consequences constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel
concede that immigration matters are collateral in criminal cases.6
However, in holding that nondisclosure constitutes "ineffective counsel,"
these jurisdictions typically emphasize the extraordinarily harsh nature of
muimgration consequences triggered by conviction or a plea of guilty 62
Subjecting a criminal defendant to deportation proceedings is equivalent
to the "loss of both property and life; or of all that makes life worth
living."63 With begrudging attitudes, these courts classify immigration
proceedings as a collateral consequence.
Practitioners in Kentucky face a troubling lack of case law on the issue
ofimmigration consequences stemming from guilty pleas. Kentucky courts
have never directly ruled on the issue of whether immigration conse-
quences constitute collateral or direct consequences of a guilty plea.
Therefore, accurately predicting the response of Kentucky courts to this
question remains an exercise in guesswork. However, the issue has arisen
before the Sixth Circuit, which may present useful insight into how the
Supreme Court of Kentucky would classify immigration consequences in
the context of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. In Ogunbase v.
16 Id. (quoting Cuthrell v Director, 475 F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir. 1973)).
57United States v Banda, 1 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 1993).
s Id. at 355. The court was refemng to United States v. Gavilan, 761 F.2d 226,
228 (5th Cir. 1985), which held that defendants have no due process right to be
notified of any collateral consequences of a guilty plea or conviction.
s9 See Banda, 1 F.3d at 356.60 See id. at 355.
61 See People v Superior Court, 523 P.2d 636, 639-40 (Cal. 1974).
62 See, e.g., People v Padilla, 502 N.E.2d 1182, 1186 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
63 Ng Fung Ho v White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
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United States,64 the Sixth-Circuit summarily denied Ogunbase's motion
alleging that his guilty plea was involuntary because his counsel neglected
to warn him of the potential immigration consequences of such a plea.65
The Sixth Circuit's position appears to be that immigration consequences
do not have a sufficient nexus to guilty pleas to warrant classification as
direct consequences.66 Therefore, assuming that Kentucky courts would
follow the analysis of Ogunbase, it appears unlikely that defendants will
succeed in persuading courts that their guilty pleas should be withdrawn on
the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Another useful way to determine how Kentucky courts would respond
to the issue of ineffective counsel is to observe how otherjurisdictions have
treated this issue. For example, State v. Aravanitis,67 a decision by the Ohio
Court of Appeals, serves as an excellent example of the calculated analysis
in which a court must engage when determining how to dispose of a new
or novel issue of law There, the court looked to federal courts and other
state courts for guidance on how to classify the immigration consequences
of a guilty plea.68 "[M]ore recent federal decisions hold that mere
failure to advise of deportation consequences, without any affirmative
misrepresentation, does not state a claim for ineffective assistance of
counsel."69 The court then proceeded to summarize varying approaches
taken by other state courts on this issue, recognizing the often striking
' Ogunbase v United States, No. 90-1781, 1991 WL 11619 (Feb. 5, 1991)
(holding that deportation is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea, and therefore
counsel's failure to warn defendant about deportation did not constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel).
"See id. at *3.
66 See Nagaro-Garbin v United States, No. 87-1148, 1987 WL 44483 (6th Cir.
Oct. 20, 1987) (holding that deportation is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea
and need not be explained to a defendant in order to preserve the voluntary nature
of the plea, and that counsel is not constitutionally ineffective due to this failure to
advise); United States v. Daas, No. 95-3310, 1995 WL 583384 (6th Cir. Oct. 3,
1995) (listing deportation as one of many examples of collateral consequences of
guilty pleas that need not be explained to a defendant in order for plea to be
voluntary). Both of these cases are unpublished dispositions, and Sixth Circuit Rule
24(c) states that citation of such cases is disfavored.
67 State v. Aravanitis, 522 N.E.2d 1089 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (holding that a
determination of whether defense counsel's failure to warn of deportation
consequences of a guilty plea constitutes ineffective counsel must be determined
on a case-by-case basis, rather than according to a per se rule).
6 See id. at 1091.
69Id. (citing United States v Santelises, 509 F.2d 703, 704 (2d Cir. 1975)).
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disparities in decisions in different states.7" Upon careful scrutiny of the
federal and state court approaches to immigration consequences of guilty
pleas, the court adopted a case-by-case approach for determining whether
an alien's guilty plea should be withdrawn due to his or her lack of full
information aboutthe possible deportation consequences when entering the
plea.7' The court ultimately did not find ineffective assistance of counsel,72
but it successfully avoided creation of a rigid rule and left the door open for
the exercise of discretion in future cases. 73 This case presents an approach
that Kentucky courts may adopt when presented by this issue.74
D. Misinformation Given by Attorney Regarding Immigration
Consequences
Of pivotal importance in some jurisdictions is whether the defense
counsel actually gave his or her client poor legal advice about the
immigration consequences of the criminal proceeding." If an alien
defendant asks his or her attorney about deportation possibilities, and the
attorney reassures the client that no such dangers exist, this may very well
7 See generally id. at 1091-95.
71 See id.
72 See id. at 1095.
7 See id. at 1094-95 ("[W]e are not disposed to announce a hard and fast rule
as to whether counsel's failure to inform an alien defendant of deportation
consequences of a guilty plea is 'a substantial violation of any of defense counsel's
essential duties to his client' so as to render counsel's assistance ineffective." Id.
(quoting State v Lytle, 358 N.E.2d 623, 627 (Ohio 1976)).
4 Another useful method of predicting how state and federal courts would
address the issue of whether immigration consequences are direct or collateral is
to analogize the issue to similar issues. InXie v. Edwards, No. 93-4385, 1994 WL
462143 (6th Cir. Aug. 25, 1994), the court held that counsel's erroneous
information given to a defendant regarding parole eligibility issues did not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. The court held that "[p]arole eligibility
is nota 'direct consequence' of a conviction, and a defendant need notbe informed
of it." Id. at *2 (quoting Brown v Permi, 718 F.2d 784, 788 (6th Cir. 1983)). Since
the court found parole eligibility to be a collateral consequence, it may also find
deportation to be collateral. This is because parole eligibility, like deportation, is
a huge factor for defendants to consider when deciding whether to plead guilty
Therefore, the court's refusal to categorize parole eligibility as a direct
consequence indicates that it would probably refuse to classify the severe
immigration consequences of a guilty plea as direct.
" See, e.g., People v Correa, 485 N.E.2d 307 (Ill. 1985).
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constitute "ineffective counsel."'76 The leading case promoting this school
of thought is People v. Correa.71 In Correa, the defendant's attorney
recommended that he plead guilty, and the defendant in return inquired as
to the possible deportation consequences of such a plea.78 Upon learning
that the defendant's wife was a United States citizen, the attorney reassured
the defendant by saying, "'I don't think you have anything to worry about.
Your record, you should get the benefit she is an American citizen. I don't
think you will be deported."' 79 Following these assurances, the defendant
entered a guilty plea, and later faced deportation proceedings due to his
conviction of a drug-related felony 80 The Correa court emphasized that
when a defendant reasonably relies upon hIs or her attorney's legal advice
in order to determine whether or not to plead guilty, and this legal advice
is later deemed to have been incompetent when given, the defendant's
guilty plea could not have been voluntary 8' The court in Correa also noted
that counsel did not merely fail to warn an alien defendant of potential
deportation consequences; rather, the defendant specifically inquired of his
attorney as to the possible immigration consequences, 2 and in response,
counsel answeredwithaninaccurate, unresearched, and entirely unsubstan-
76 See Sparks v. Sowders, 852 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that grossly
incorrect advice concerning parol eligibility, a collateral consequence, may affect
the voluntary nature of the guilty plea). But see Xie v. Edwards, No. 93-4385, 1993
WL 462143 (6th Cir. Aug. 25, 1994). The court held that counsel's erroneous
information given to a defendant regarding parole eligibility issues did not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore, if Kentucky courts and the
Sixth Circuit categorize immigration consequences of a guilty plea as collateral
consequences, Xie suggests that even misinformation given to clients regarding
immigration consequences would not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
Another issue that may arise is whether misinformation given to alien
defendants regarding guilty pleas violates due process requirements. In Brown v.
Penni, 718 F.2d 784,789 (6th Cir. 1983), the court held that misinformation given
by a trial judge regarding the collateral consequences of a guilty plea does not
constitute a due process violation and, therefore, the guilty plea remained valid.
" People v Correa, 485 N.E.2d 307 (Ill. 1985).
78 See id. at 309.
791 d. (quoting unnamed defense attorney).
'o See d. at 310.
"S id. This conclusion is based upon the premise of Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742 (1970), in which the United States Supreme Court held that a waiver
of one's constitutional rights must be knowingly and voluntarily made, and must
be done with substantial awareness of the probable outcome and the circumstances
surrounding the waiver. See id. at 748.82See Correa, 485 N.E.2d at 311.
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tiated attempt to give the client legal advice. Thus, the issue presented in
Correa was transformed from whether failure to advise a client of
immigration consequences is deemed ineffective counsel to whether
affirmatively misleading the client with false assurances regarding
immigration consequences constitute, "ineffective counsel."83
The court likened this situation to other cases in which attorneys had
engaged m misrepresentation to their clients that resulted in guilty pleas. 4
Even courts that decline to find a valid claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel when defense attorneys failedto disclose deportation consequences
to clients have acknowledged that the result reached may differ in cases
where affirmative misrepresentations of fact were given to the client. In
Villavende v. State,8S the court held that defense counsel's failure to discuss
collateral consequences regarding immigration with his client did not
constitute ineffective assistance.86 This decision was partly based on the
fact that the defendant never informed his counsel that he was a foreign
national.87 However, the crux of the court's opinion was rooted m the
notion that counsel did not give maccurate legal advice. The court noted
that had maccurate legal advice been given, the result may have been
different.8 Misleading representations by prosecutors may also require
withdrawal of a guilty plea elicited by such misrepresentations. The court
in UnitedStates v. Russell8 9 statedthatjudges must consider several factors
when determining whether to allow a withdrawal of a guilty plea.90 When
a defendant misunderstands the collateral consequences of a plea due to
misleading statements by the prosecuting attorney, this weighs heavily m
favor of withdrawing the guilty plea.9 "[A] plea that has been induced by
maccurate prosecutorial suggestions about its consequences cannot be
considered voluntary and must be vacated."92
83 See id.
84 Cf. People v Morreale, 107 N.E.2d 721 (Ill. 1952) (holding that defendant
may withdraw guilty plea based on his attorney's misrepresentation that he would
only be sentenced to probation); People v Owsley, 383 N.E.2d 271 (Ill. 1978)
(holding defendant's guilty pleas were involuntary and unknowing due to her
attorney's misrepresentation of minimum time eligible for parole).85Villavende v. State, 504 So. 2d 455 (Fla. Ct. App. 1987).
86 See id. at 456.
87 See id.
88 See id. at 456-57
89 United States v Russell, 686 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (permitting defendant
to withdraw guilty plea because the prosecutor failed to warn him of the possibility
of deportation upon conviction).
90 See id. at 39.
91 See id. at 41.92Id. at 42.
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E. What Does Failure to Warn oflmmigration Consequences Really
Mean?
A criminal defense attorney who represents aliens must familiarize
himself or herself with relevant case law and statutes in his or her own
jurisdiction. Various courts can reach drastically different results regarding
the same issue. Many factors warrant attention in assessing how one's
jurisdiction wouldtreat similar issues. Thejunsdiction's case law approach
to ineffective-assistance-of-counsel arguments regarding immigration
proceedings merits analysis. As discussed above, many jurisdictions
essentially dismiss any and all claims of ineffective counsel for failure to
warn of immigration consequences simply because the immigration aspect
of criminal law has been firmly established as a collateral consequence of
trial.93 Other courts have refused to allow the classification of immigration
issues as "collateral consequences." In People v. Padilla,94 the defendant's
attorney knew from the beginning of the attorney-client relationship that
the defendant was an alien.95 The attorney never mentioned the possibility
of deportation despite his admitted knowledge about immigration law and
its possible consequences in the defendant's case.96 The defendant claimed
that he repeatedly inquired of his counsel as to whether there might be
immigration consequences, and he maintained that the attorney responded
in the negative.97 The court held that if the client's version of what
transpired was an accurate portrayal of the facts, then the attorney had
made affirmative misrepresentations to the defendant and thereby
destroyed the voluntary nature of the guilty plea.9" In fact, even if these
allegations of misrepresentation were false, the court found counsel to be
ineffective. The court relied on the Correa decision in holding that despite
the collateral nature of immigration proceedings, counsel had a duty to
discuss them with his or her client because of the incredibly harsh nature
of deportation as a collateral consequence of a conviction.99 The court
elaborated by stating, "The overall trend in state courts favors finding
ineffective assistance rendering a guilty plea involuntary, where counsel
93 See, e.g., United States v. Banda, 1 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 1993); United States
v. George, 869 F.2d 333 (7th Cir. 1989); State v Ginebra, 511 So. 2d 960 (Fla.
1987); In re Peters, 750 P.2d 643 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988).
14 People v. Padilla, 502 N.E.2d 1182 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
9' See id.
96See d. at 1183.
SSee id.
91 See d. at 1186.
99See i. at 1185.
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knows his client is an alien and does nothing to inform him of possible
deportation consequences."1'0 While many otherjurisdictions may disagree
with the comment regarding the "trend" m state courts, it cannot be denied
that a very real gulf exists between courts that will find ineffective
assistance of counsel in such cases and those that will not. Correa stands
for the proposition that when an attorney gives legal advice to a client
regarding immigration consequences, he or she must be cautious. Under
Correa, advice that is an maccurate misrepresentation of the law constitutes
ineffective assistance of counsel. °1
The obvious conclusion is that it is better to err on the side of caution
by inquirng into the immigration status of a client before giving legal
advice regarding a guilty plea. A zealous advocate will better serve his or
her client by discussing all potential consequences, whether direct or
collateral, with a client. This empowers the client to make a more fully
informed decision regarding whether to enter a guilty plea, and it may
eliminate litigation regarding the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel.
An attorney will more fully comply with the American Bar Association's
Standards for Crminal Justice by discussing all potential consequences
with a client and by taking the time to fully investigate the pertinent
immigration law provisions. The ABA standards regarding plea agreements
state, "'To aid the defendant in reaching a decision, defense counsel, after
appropriate investigation, should advise the defendant of the alternatives
available and ofconsiderations deemed importantby defense counsel or the
defendant in reaching a decision."" 02
F Statutory Requzrements that Courts Inform Defendants of
Deportation Consequences
Statutory authority is another critical area to research in determining
how one's jurisdiction regards failure to disclose deportation consequences
to a client. The general rule dictates that trial courts, absent a court rule or
statute to the contrary, have no duty to advise criminal defendants of
related immigration issues before entry of a guilty plea. 03 However, since
1986, six states have enacted statutes that require trial courts to inform
'0°Id. at 1186.
10 See People v Correa, 485 N.E.2d 307, 312 (Ill. 1985); accord People v
Soriano, 240 Cal. Rptr. 328, 335 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
'02 Soriano, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 335 (quoting 3 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, std. 14-3.2, at 73 (2d ed. 1980)).
103 See In re Peters, 750 P.2d 643, 645 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988).
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alien defendants of any potential deportation consequences that may result
from a guilty plea. These six states are California, Connecticut, Massachu-
setts, Oregon, Texas, and Washington. ' If the trial court fails to warn a
defendant of the possible immigration consequences before he or she enters
a guilty plea, reversible error results. In a jurisdiction that finds immigra-
tion consequences so important as to compel trial judges to disclose the
existence of such consequences to alien defendants, defense counsel
probably will be expected to discuss these collateral consequences with
alien defendants as well.
Kentucky does not have a statute requiring trial judges to inform alien
defendants ofpossible deportation consequences of a guilty plea. Addition-
ally, mBoscan v. United States,0 1 the Sixth Circuit held that trial judges do
not have a duty to advise alien defendants of the possible deportation
consequences of a guilty plea.' In these circumstances, the role of counsel
as sole advisor is even more critical.
III. NON-ENGLISH-SPEAKING ALIEN
DEFENDANTS AND COURT INTERPRETERS
A. The Right to an Interpreter in Federal Courts
The law entitles non-English-speaking defendants in crimial
proceedings to a qualified interpreter in both the federal court system 0 7 and
m most, if not all, state court systems. 08 However, vast differences exist
between the federal system and most state court systems with regard to
interpreters. The federal court system is governed by the Court
Interpreters Act, 1 9 which secures a non-English-speaking defendant the
right to an interpreter m United States district courts whenever litigation is
initiated by the United States. The Act's relevant provision states:
The presiding judicial officer shall utilize the services of the most
available certified interpreter, or when no certified interpreter is reason-
ably available, as determined by the presidingjudicial officer, the services
"06 See People v Pozo, 746 P.2d 523, 526 (Colo. 1987).
105 Boscan v. United States, No. 89-3642, 1990 WL 27159 (6th Cir. Mar. 14,
1990).
106 See id. at *2.
107 See 28 U.S.C. § 1827(d) (1994).
1o8 See, e.g., N.M. CONST. art. II, § 14 (1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4351
(1997).
,09 28 U.S.C. § 1827 (1994).
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of an otherwise qualified interpreter, in judicial proceedings instituted by
the United States, if the presiding judicial officer determines on such
officer's own motion or on the motion of a party that such party (includ-
ing a defendant in a criminal case), or a witness who may present
testimony m such judicial proceedings speaks only or pnmarily a
language other than the English language so as to inhibit such party's
comprehension of the proceedings or communication with counsel or the
presiding judicial officer, or so as to inhibit such witness' comprehension
of questions and the presentation of such testimony. 11
In order to qualify as a certified interpreter of a foreign language under
this Act, a candidate must take a federal examination in that language."
An oral component and a written component comprise the examination,
and the potential interpreter must pass the test in both English and the
foreign language.' 2 The interpreter examination is challenging; however,
a candidate may pass the examination with an eighty percent score."'
When one considers the importance of a court interpreter's function -
translating every word spoken within the confines of the courtroom for a
non-English-speaking defendant - the possibility for error is awesome."
4
While the federal court system has stringent standards governing who
qualifies as a court interpreter, other impediments must be overcome in
order to facilitate the goal of equality of justice. First and foremost, the
presiding judge must be made aware of the need for an interpreter. Many
disincentives might tempt a judge to dismiss the idea of a need for an
interpreter. For example, trials that require an interpreter take longer to
conduct because the communication process is invariably slowed down.
Additionally, hiring an interpreter becomes expensive m a trial of any
"Old. § 1827(d)(2).
.. See Michael B. Shulman, No Hablo Ingles: Court Interpretation as a Major
Obstacle toFairnessforNon-English SpealangDefendants, 46 VAND. L.REv 175,
180-81 (1993).
112 See id.
11 See id. at 181.
114 All languages have colloquialisms that are difficult to comprehend. In order
to function effectively as an interpreter, one must have some cultural understanding
and an appreciation for the various colloquialisms present in the language. For
example, the term "mueble" in Spanish is taught in classrooms as meaning
"furniture." OXFORD POCKET DICCIONARIO ESTUDIANTES DE INGLES 195 (Patrick
Goldsmith & M. Angeles Perez eds., 1995). However, in rural Mexico, residents
use "mueble" to indicate "automobile." (This example is from the author's own
experience.) The potential for error based on such differences alarms advocates for
immigrants.
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substantial length, as the interpreter must be compensated for his or her
time." 5 However, it may be easier to persuade a judge to obtain an
interpreter by simply hinting at the possibility for an appeal on the basis of
the judge's denial of an interpreter. 6 Another problem arises because the
Court Interpreters Act only requires appointment of a certified interpreter
when one is "reasonably available."' '7 Some judges may findthis to require
a good faith effort to obtain a certified interpreter, while others may find
that any inconvemence exceeds the scope of "reasonably available."118
B. The Right to an Interpreter in State Courts
Most states acknowledge that a criminal defendant who does not speak
English has the right to an interpreter.119 Some states simply require that an
interpreter be appointed "when necessary," while other states specifically
spell out circumstances under which an interpreter is needed. 20 Unlike the
federal court system, no uniform mechanism for testing, certifying, and
selecting interpreters controls the realm of state courts. Therefore, even
fewer guarantees as to the quality of interpretive skills protect the mtegrity
of the state court systems than in the federal court system.
Kentucky has passed statutes regarding the right to an interpreter in its
state courts. 121 The Kentucky statutes, which apply to both civil and
criminal cases, explain that a court must appoint an interpreter when
necessary 122 An interpreter must be provided when a key participant in the
proceeding is unable to understand the events transpiring during the
proceeding without interpretive services. 13
The court m any matter, criminal or civil, shall appoint a qualified
interpreter or interpreters for the following categories of persons,
whether they are parties, jurors, or witnesses:
(b) Persons who cannot communicate in English; and
" See Shulman, supra note 111, at 184. Kentucky pays interpreters' fees from
the state treasury according to the "Pay Schedule of the Judicial Personnel System."
KY. REV STAT. ANN. [hereinafter K.R.S.] § 30A.420 (Banks Baldwin 1992).
"'6 See Shulman, supra note 111, at 182.
"17 28 U.S.C. § 1827(d)(1) (1994).
"8 See Shulman, supra note 111, at 182-83.
"9 See id. at 178.
20 See id. at 179.
'' See K.R.S. §§ 30A.400- 435 (Banks-Baldwin 1996).
2 See d. § 30A.410.
123 See id.
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(c) Any other person who has, in the opinion of the court,
another type of disability whic-i will prevent him from properly
understanding the nature of the proceedings or substantially prejudice
his nghts.124
The use of the word "shall" indicates that judges may not ignore an
obvious need for an interpreter simply because the use of an interpreter
may prolong the proceeding. Kentucky clearly realizes that an injustice will
result if a key participant m a trial cannot comprehend the substance of the
trial. Despite this great stride toward procurngjustice for alien defendants,
this rule does not eliminate the difficulty of convincing a judge that an
individual does in fact need an interpreter. An impatient judge with a
pressing court docket may exercise his or her wide discretion regarding the
need for an interpreter irresponsibly Ajudge may find that the interest in
a fair, speedy proceeding outweighs the need for an interpreter because of
the slow and tedious pace of court proceedings with an interpreter."'
In Kentucky, legislators have attempted to establish a system to ensure
that interpreters chosen to serve injudicial proceedings are qualified. "Any
person appointed as interpreter shall be qualified by training or
experience to interpret effectively, accurately, and impartially, both recep-
tively and expressively, using any necessary specialized vocabulary ,
126
Furthermore, the legislature has placed the responsibility of creating
standards to govern a qualification or certification procedure with the
Kentucky Supreme Court."' While this statute recognizes the need for a
screening process for potential court interpreters, the Kentucky Supreme
Court has yet to set forth the standards for carrying out the legislative
policy of providing qualified interpreters to those who need them.
C. Constitutional Right to an Interpreter
Do non-English-speaking criminal defendants have a constitutional
right to an interpreter during criminal proceedings? The United States
Supreme Court has never answered this question directly However, lower
'24 1d. § 30A.410(l).
125 The vast majority of judges take their responsibilities seriously and use
whatever measures are necessary to secure ajust trial. However, there is great risk
inherent in a decision regarding the need for an interpreter. If a judge were to
disregard the evidence that a trial participant needed an interpreter, it would
severely undercut the justice of our system.
126 K.R.S. § 30A.405(1).
12 See id. § 30A.405(2).
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courts have held that the United States Constitution does secure this right.
UnitedStates ex rel. Negron v. State'28 presents a compelling argument that
the right to an interpreter does indeed fall within the rights secured to all
criminal defendants under the Constitution.'29 The Sixth Amendment 3 °
provides to all criminal defendants the same rights, regardless of their
immigration status.' The Sixth Amendment also gives a defendant the
right to confront witnesses against him or her.'32 It can easily be argued that
by denying anon-English-speaking defendant the right to an interpreter, the
judicial system would essentially be denying the defendant the ability to
confront those witnesses against him. This conclusion follows as a logical
extension of the Sixth Amendment because it is true to the spirit of the text.
Clearly, by guaranteeing defendants the right to confront witnesses against
them, the Framers intended that this not be limited to a physical, visible
interaction. In order to do justice to the spirit of the Sixth Amendment, it
is necessary to interpret it as granting a defendant the right to understand
the witnesses testifying against him or her. Otherwise, the defendant would
not have an opportunity to point out maccurate testimony, respond to
allegations made by witnesses, or discuss the weight of such testimony
with his attorney These opportunities are critical for a criminal defendant.
Likewise, the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel does not
merely guarantee the physical presence of an attorney sitting next to a
defendant at the defense table."' Rather, the Supreme Court has held that
assistance of counsel requires "effective assistance of counsel," so that
every defendant has access to a reasonably competent attorney 134
Additionally, the Sixth Amendment secures the right of a criminal
defendant to participate in his own defense.3 5 This is impossible when a
language barrier exists between the attorney and client and there is no one
available to bridge the interpretation gap.
Negron established many protections for non-English-speaking
defendants. At issue in the case was whether the court's failure to provide
a translator for a non-English-speaking criminal defendant violated his
2i' United States ex rel. Negron v State, 434 F.2d 386 (2d Cir. 1970).
129 See id.
130 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
"3 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury and to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him "Id.
132 See id.
13 See zd.
131 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 669 (1984).
135 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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constitutional rights.3 6 The trial court had provided no interpretive services
for the defendant, and neither the defendant nor his attorney ever requested
such services. 7 Due to the fact that Negron spoke no English and his
attorney spoke no Spanish, the court held that it was impossible for Negron
to have actively participated in his own defense despite his legal right to do
so. 38 Additionally, the court held that Negron was unable to confront
adverse witnesses, a right secured by the Sixth Amendment, as he was
entirely without ability to understand what they were saying. 3 9 The court
held that the Sixth Amendment "includes the right to cross-examine those
witnesses as an 'essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair
trial which is this country's constitutional goal,"40 and concluded that for
a non-English-speaking defendant to be able to cross-examine adverse
witnesses, a qualified interpreter must necessarily be provided. The court
analogizedNegron's inability to understand hs trial to a criminal defendant
not being permitted to appear at his own trial. 4' "Considerations of
faimess, the integrity of the fact-finding process, and the potency of our
adversary system of justice forbid that the state should prosecute a
defendant who is not present at his own trial ,142 If a criminal
defendant chooses to waive his or her right to be present at trial, no
constitutional violation exists.43 However, the court summarily dismissed
any argument that Negron had waived his right to an interpreter, or that his
counsel had in effect waived that right for him. The court acknowledged
that in 1970, the law had not conclusively settled whether the right to an
interpreter prevailed, and so it would not have been surprising if Negron's
attorney was unaware of his client's right to have an interpreter present.'"
The court, by rejecting the state's argument that Negron waived his right
to an interpreter, followed the United States Supreme Court's logic in Pate
v Robinson4 ' when it held that "'it is contradictory to argue that a
defendant may be incompetent, and yet knowingly or intelligently waive
"' See United States ex reL Negron v State, 434 F.2d 386 (2d Cir. 1970).
137 An interpreter employed on behalf of the prosecution translated for the
defendantthe trial judge's voir dire instructions and bnefly summarized forhim the
testimony of some English-speaking witnesses. Otherwise, the trial was just a
"babble of voices." Id. at 388.
'38 See id. at 389.
131 See id.
'4 Id. (quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965)).
141 See id.
142 Id.
143 See id.
144 See id. at 390.
145 Pate v Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
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his right to have the court determine hIs capacity to stand trial."',' It is
difficult to conceive of a justice system that presumes that a criminal
defendant waived his or her opportunity to understand what transpired
during his or her trial because he or she did not request an interpreter, when
the defendant had no way of knowing that he or she was indeed entitled to
this service.
D. Problem Areas that Accompany Use of an Interpreter in Criminal
Proceedings
Court interpreters hold a staggering amount of power over a non-
English-speaking defendant. No one in the courtroom, except for the
interpreter, truly knows what the defendant is saying. Every word that he
or she speaks must be channeled through and translated by a virtual
stranger. The court record cannot reflect what the defendant actually said
in open court because no court reporters are there to transcribe the
testimony m the defendant's native tongue. Rather, the court record reflects
only what the interpreter believes and perceives to be the actual words of
the defendant. This opens up a myriad of possibilities. A qualified
interpreter may still make a grave error regarding what the defendant
actually said or actually meant due to a wide divergence of expressions
solely reserved to specific cultures or regions. However, even if the
interpreter were to make a significant error, it would stand uncorrected
because there is no actual record of what the defendant said in his or her
native language on the day in question. An interpreter's job is challenging
and difficult. Language is an imprecise art and many words do not literally
translate from one language to the next. In addition to this obstacle, many
bilingual individuals lack sufficient skills to accurately translate the legal
terminology that permeates a criminal proceeding. Therefore, even the
defendant who has access to a translator runs a grave risk of being
misunderstood, with no mechaism of correcting the error or even knowing
that it exists until it is too late. What can be done to improve the imperfect
nature of language interpretation? Many suggestions are made m No Hablo
Ingles: Court Interpretation as a Major Obstacle to Fairness for Non-
English Spealng Defendants.'47 The author, Michael Shulman, suggests
that courts utilize two interpreters at one time to enable the two translators
to notice and correct any errors they may make. 4 However, this could pose
'46 United States ex rel. Negron v State, 434 F.2d 386, 390 (2d Cir. 1970)
(quoting Pate, 383 U.S. at 384).
"' See Shulman, supra note 111, at 191-95.
141 See id. at 193.
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a financial difficulty for many jurisdictions, and it is unlikely that states
with small immigrant populations would have a sufficient pool of qualified
interpreters to make this goal a reality 149 Additionally, some errors may not
be detected even in the presence of two interpreters because dialect,
colloquialisms, and regional terminology may not be fully understood by
either of the interpreters due to the inprecise nature of language interpreta-
tion. I Another suggestion includes audiotaping the entire proceedings, so
that any serious interpretation errors noted later could be proven.'
Videotaping the proceeding would give even more insight into what the
defendant said and meant by providing reviewing authorities an opportu-
nity to see his or her facial expression and body language. However, one
potential problem with either of these two methods of avoiding interpretive
errors is the fear that appellate courts would be swamped with audio and
videotapes subject to review based on claims of incorrect interpretation.
1 2
Analogous case precedent and persuasively compelling arguments
indicate that the United States Constitution secures the right to an
interpreterby anon-English-speaking crimmal defendant. 53 However, even
with this protection in place, many other dangers threaten to undermine any
attempts to level the playing field for non-English speakers. The interpre-
tive process is riddled with ambiguities and doubt, but as of yet no
successful mechamsm for avoiding these dangers has been constructed.
CONCLUSION
A brief analysis of the current state of immigration law in the United
States makes it abundantly clear that many changes pose grave dangers to
non-citizen criminal defendants. Equally clear is the need for criminal
defense attorneys to make informed decisions before giving legal advice to
such clients. Unfortunately, many defense attorneys do not have an
understanding of the IIRIRA14 sufficient to offer their non-citizen clients
an accurate portrayal of the possible immigration consequences facing
them. In order to provide effective assistance of counsel, criminal defense
attorneys must arm themselves with knowledge about the immigration
consequences that may affect their clients. Alternatively, they must decline
to accept these cases and refer the clients to an attorney with a working
149 See id.
'5o See id. at 193-94.
' See id. at 194.
152 See id.
"' See, e.g., United States ex rel. Negron v State, 434 F.2d 386 (2d Cir. 1970).
114 See supra note 1.
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knowledge of current immigration laws. Giving misleading or inaccurate
advice to a client regarding possible immigration consequences may not
only constitute ineffective counsel but may also open the door to possible
lawsuits for attorney malpractice. 55 To proceed in the face of ignorance is
a disservice to both the alien client and the integrity of the justice system.
Trends in the federal and state court systems evidence a recognition of
the necessity of providing an interpreter for non-English-speaking clients
in the justice system. The federal system has created a mechanism for
ensuring that interpreters meet at least mimmum standards of competency
before they are able to serve. However, many state court systems do not
have such a screening mechanism available. The possibility of having
unqualified interpreters functioning within the judicial system raises
questions of constitutional significance. If a criminal defendant depends
entirely on another human being as his or her only means of commumca-
tion with the attorney and the judge, then the testimony is essentially not
Ins or her own. Rather, a type of "filtration system" takes the non-English-
speaking person's words and attempts to fit them into an entirely different
language. The danger of human error on the part of the interpreter could
create immense problems for the criminal defendant. A qualification
system must be established in the state courts in order to ensure that alien
defendants receive the fairest trial possible, in spite of the numerous other
obstacles facing them in the justice system.
'5 The concept of attorney malpractice exceeds the scope of this Note. For a
more detailed discussion, see F Scott Pfeiffer, Does Failure to Advise Clients of
Immigration Consequences of Guilty Pleas Constitute Malpractice?, 9 S.C. LAW
32 (1997).
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